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TAX EXCEPTIONALISM: WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE
Gene Magidenko*
Tax law has just not been the same since January 2011. Did
Congress pass earthshaking legislation affecting the Internal
Revenue Code? Did the IRS dramatically change regulations? If
only it were that exciting. Instead, eight jurists sitting at One First
Street in our nation’s capital transformed tax law in a less bloody,
but no less profound, way. The thought must have gone through
many a tax mind – is tax exceptionalism dead?
THE SUPREME COURT, TAX POLICY, AND MAYO FOUNDATION
Most citizens, and indeed many lawyers, do not think of the
Supreme Court as having any considerable role in shaping tax
policy. The general perception is that tax law originates
exclusively from the statutory behemoth of the Internal Revenue
Code and the even larger and drier accompanying body of tax
regulations. However, anyone who has taken a course in tax law
(and paid attention) is surely familiar with a number of cases
having
a
profound
effect
on
the
field.
Names
like Crane, Duberstein, Kirby Lumber, Macomber, and of course
an entire mélange of Helverings have run through the frantic
mind of many a law student as he prepared for his income tax
class examination.
And since the beginning of this year, there is one more name
to add to the list – Mayo Foundation. 1 In its unanimous decision, 2
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1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 704
(2011).
2. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the case.
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the Supreme Court held that courts should apply Chevron 3
deference to Department of Treasury regulations, just as they
already do with regulations issued by other agencies. Before Mayo
Foundation, Treasury regulations were evaluated under the less
deferential and more nuanced standard established in National
Muffler. 4 But in Mayo Foundation, the Supreme Court relied on
the practical consideration of simplifying courts’ review of
regulations. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “We see no
reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by
agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our
review of other regulations.” 5
AN ASIDE ON TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
The reasoning behind Mayo Foundation suggests that tax
regulations should not be treated differently from regulations in
other fields because tax law is not fundamentally different.
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address it, the
debate over “tax exceptionalism” – the idea that tax law is special –
has been a hot topic among scholars for years. The recent trend
has been toward a rejection of tax law’s uniqueness. 6 The idea is
both positive and normative. Positively, opponents of
exceptionalism assert that there is already extensive crosspollination among fields within the law, and it is nonsensical to
deny the fact. Normatively, the argument goes that legal
discourse can be enriched through interdisciplinary interaction.
Foes of tax exceptionalism understandably see much to
celebrate in Mayo Foundation. The reasoning in the case seems to
reject the idea that tax is different. 7 The Court noted with little
ado that since the taxpayer had “not advanced any justification for
applying a less deferential standard of review to Treasury
regulations,” absent such justification, there would be no reason
“to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax

3.
(1984).
4.
5.
6.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713.
See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to
Be Tax Lawyers, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 517 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead:
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006).
7. See Roger Dorsey, Mayo and the End of ‘Tax Exceptionalism’ in Judicial Deference,

87 Practical Tax Strategies 63, 63 (2011).
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law only.”8 But it may be too soon to read tax exceptionalism’s
eulogy quite yet.
THE CASE FOR TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayo Foundation – and
specifically the part quoted above – leaves open the possibility that
there may be reasons justifying a different approach to tax
regulations. If someone could advance a justification for tax
exceptionalism, then perhaps a different standard of review might
be warranted. I am willing to take on the challenge by suggesting
two reasons why tax law is different. The first is a constitutionalorigin theory. The second is an eminently practical one.
The Constitution enumerates those powers that Congress may
use to “promote the general Welfare.” 9 Most of the modern
regulatory state derives from congressional delegations under the
Commerce Clause, 10 a provision that has effectively become a
catch-all for government regulatory authority (with some limited
exceptions) since the Great Depression. The power to tax, however,
originates from an entirely different source – the Taxing and
Spending Clause. 11 Where Congress has the authority to regulate,
that power is plenary, so it is tempting to conclude that legislation
or delegation under one constitutional provision is just as good as
that under another. Yet more than two centuries of constitutional
jurisprudence have created a gloss that separates bodies of
interpretive law governing the various parts of the Constitution.
When the Supreme Court analyzes a Commerce Clause issue, it
approaches the matter differently than when it analyzes a taxing
power question. The Court follows different analytical structures
and relies on different assumptions. History is important as well.
Although the Commerce Clause’s interpretation is rather
mercurial, it has never been de jure amended like the Taxing and
Spending Clause. In other words, the Supreme Court does not
approach all constitutional provisions equally, so there is no
reason why it should assume that delegations under those
provisions are coequal.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713.
U.S. Const. pmbl.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, expanded by U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
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Constitutional arguments aside, anecdotal and empirical
evidence suggest that the tax code is in some ways unique. Ask
any given American how he views the Internal Revenue Code, and
you are likely to receive a variety of responses. But the general
sense is that the tax laws somehow feel “different.” It is telling that
Title 26 of the United States Code is rarely referred to by its title
number, with practitioners and laymen alike referring to it as the
“Internal Revenue Code” instead. And no other set of laws is as
specific. Tax provisions are by far the most substantively
complicated and detailed. Congress is constantly adjusting,
tweaking, and altering the tax code. A brief search through the
Library of Congress THOMAS portal 12 of congressional bills over
any given session shows that the Internal Revenue Code is the
most popular target for proposed amendments.
The fact that Congress so regularly amends the tax laws
suggests a level of oversight not present in other fields. Although
some might conclude that this should merit an even-greater
degree of deference than Chevron,13 I contend that the opposite is
true. 14 Constant congressional attention to the tax code suggests
that the delegation of authority to the Treasury Department
is more limited than that to other branches. Congress delegates
because it cannot manage a vast regulatory apparatus on its own.
Where Congress constantly oversees and alters a collection of
laws,15 any delegation must inherently be narrower in scope.
Congressional intention is more likely to displace agency
interpretations, requiring a more rigorous analysis of
reasonableness than Chevron can supply. Accordingly, agency
actions under such delegation should be subject to greater
12. Thomas (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
13. The argument would ostensibly be that if Treasury promulgates a regulation
with which Congress disagrees, Congress is more likely to correct it. That Congress has not
corrected it implies agreement. This argument is problematic because it is not realistic to
expect Congress to correct every (or any) improper Treasury regulation through legislative
action. Indeed, Treasury itself often fails to repeal outdated or superseded regulations.
14. Treasury occasionally seeks to reverse losses sustained in the courts by issuing
regulations. These so-called “fighting regulations” are likely to become more common with
greater deference post-Mayo. See Clifford M. Sloan et al., Supreme Court’s Mayo
Foundation Opinion Grants Chevron Deference to Treasury Regulations, The Tax
Executive, Spring 2011, at 35, 40, available at http://skadden.com/content/Publications/Publi
cations2434_0.pdf.
15. In practice, Congress only nominally oversees the effect of tax laws, while much
of the actual oversight is in the hands of the Treasury Department. Treasury generally
monitors the tax code and frequently suggests changes to Congress. No other constituency
has as thorough or consistent access to the legislative tax apparatus.
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scrutiny. In the pre-Mayo Foundation era, courts’ capacity to
overturn unreasonable interpretations of the ever-changing tax
code by Treasury (by any account a prolific agency when it comes
to issuing regulations and other guidance) was an important tool
by which poorly functioning regulations were altered. Greater
deference to Treasury interpretations removes this corrective
process.
CONCLUSION
Tax lawyers will be discussing Mayo Foundation for years to
come. The case itself left open more questions than it answered.
Those will have to eventually be resolved in the courts. Although
some may see Mayo Foundation as a facial rejection of tax
exceptionalism, the situation is not quite so simple. The Supreme
Court is unlikely to overrule the case anytime soon, but the
distinction between tax law and other fields – a distinction with
constitutional and logical bases – still has some vitality.

